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THE GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR DEFENSE:
A WEAPON FOR NONMILITARY GOVERNMENT CONTRACTORS?
Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.,
108 S. Ct. 2510 (1988)
I. INTRODUCTION
In Boyle v. United Technologies Corp. 1 the United States Supreme Court
for the first time recognized a government contractor defense that shields pri-
vate contractors from state tort liability for design defects contained in govern-
ment specifications. 2 The Court's underlying rationale for the defense indicates
an application of the defense broader than has generally been recognized among
the circuits. 3
Part I of this casenote presents the facts and procedural history of Boyle v.
United Technologies Corp. Part II provides a historical overview of the de-
velopment of the government contractor defense, including the rationale on which
lower federal courts have based the defense, and the three different formula-
tions of the defense. Part III presents the reasoning underpinning the Court's
recognition of the defense. Finally, Part IV analyzes the scope of the Boyle
decision and examines issues left unresolved.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On April 27, 1983, David A. Boyle, a United States Marine helicopter co-
pilot, was killed when the helicopter in which he was flying crashed into the
Atlantic Ocean off the Virginia coast. I Boyle survived the impact of the crash,
but he was unable to escape from the helicopter and drowned. I Boyle's father
brought a diversity action against the Sikorsky Division of United Technolo-
gies Corporation (hereinafter "Sikorsky"), the manufacturer of the helicopter, 6 in
Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. I The petitioner,
alleging defective design of the helicopter's escape hatch, sued for tort liability
I. 108 S. Ct. 2510 (1988).
2. Id. at 2518.
3. Ayer, The Defense Defense, 18 THE BRIEF 17 (1989) (Donald B. Ayer, as Deputy Solicitor General
and Counselor to the Solicitor General until December 1988, argued Boyle for the United States.).
4. Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2513.
5. Id. All four crew members survived the impact of the crash; three of them escaped through emer-
gency exits, but Boyle was unable to escape. Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 792 F.2d 413, 414 (4th
Cir. 1986).
6. Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2513.
7. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at A-I, Boyle, 108 S. Ct. 2510. The district court decision was not
reported.
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under Virginia law. 8 The jury awarded the petitioner $725,000, and the dis-
trict court denied Sikorsky's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 9
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded with direc-
tions that judgment be entered for Sikorsky.' 0 The court held that Sikorsky could
not be held liable for the allegedly defective design of the escape hatch because
it was entitled to the "military contractor defense." "
The Supreme Court of the United States granted a writ of certiorari 12 in or-
der to "decide when a contractor providing military equipment to the Federal
Government can be held liable under state tort law for injury caused by a de-
sign defect." '3 In affirming, the Court specifically adopted the formulation of
the government contractor defense used by the Fourth Circuit below. '*
III. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY
A. Government Agency Defense
The government contractor defense is widely considered by cases to have
originated from the government agency defense applied in Yearsley v. W. A.
Ross Construction Co. '5 In Yearsley the Supreme Court refused to hold a con-
tractor liable for erosion of private riparian land caused by the construction of
dikes pursuant to a contract with the federal government. 16 The Court reasoned
that the contractor, having performed under authority validly conferred and hav-
ing not exceeded his authority, was not liable because he was acting as an "agent
or officer of the Government." "7 The Court thus determined that where such
8. Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2513. The petitioner alleged that Sikorsky had defectively designed the copilot's
emergency escape system because the escape hatch opened out instead of in, rendering the hatch ineffective
in a submerged craft because of water pressure. Id.
9. Id. at 2513.
10. Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 792 F.2d 413, 414 (4th Cir. 1986).
11. Id. at 415.
12. Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 479 U.S. 1029 (1987).
13. Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2513.
14. Id. at 2518.
15. 309 U.S. 18 (1940). See Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403, 405 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
108 S. Ct. 2897 (1988) (citing Yearsley, government contractor defense shields a contractor from liability
when acting under authority and direction of United States); Tillett v. J.1. Case Co., 756 F.2d 591, 596
(7th Cir. 1985) (government contractor defense derives from cases such as Yearsley); McKay v. Rockwell
Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 448 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984) (government contractor
defense first articulated by the Supreme Court in Yearsley). One circuit has taken the view that the govern-
ment contractor defense is an "amalgamation" of the contract specifications defense (based on common law
tort principles) and the government agency defense. Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556, 565 (5th Cir.
1985). The Eleventh Circuit views the government agency defense as "analytically distinct" from the government
contractor defense. Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d 736, 739 (1 1th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
108 S. Ct. 2896 (1988). See Note, The Government Contract Defense in Product Liability Suits: Lethal Weapon
for Non-Military Government Contractors, 37 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1131, 1133 (1987); Comment, In Defense
of the Government Contractor Defense, 36 CATH. U.L. REV. 219, 228-30 (1986).
16. Yearsley, 309 U.S. at 20-21.
17. Id. at 21.
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a contractor performed within the scope of validly conferred authority, he was
allowed to share vicariously the government's sovereign immunity. 18 Since
Yearsley, when contractors perform public works projects as agents or officers
of the government according to government specifications, they are permitted
to partake of the government's immunity in cases arising from the
projects. 19 Applying the Yearsley defense 20 to an independent military con-
tractor is problematic as one element of the defense, that the contractor has
acted as an agent or officer of the government, is missing. 21 Independent mili-
tary contractors thus are essentially foreclosed from asserting the Yearsley govern-
ment agency defense. 22
B. Sovereign Immunity and the Federal Tort Claims Act
The government contractor defense derives from and is partially justified by
the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 23 This doctrine precludes suits brought
against the government without its consent. 24 The doctrine derived from the
notion that "the King could do no wrong" and was incorporated into American
jurisprudence in the early nineteenth century. 25 In 1946 Congress enacted the
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) 26 in order to mitigate the harshness of sover-
eign immunity and to allow governmental consent to suit in limited situa-
tions. 27 The FTCA is only a partial waiver of sovereign immunity from tort
claims. If the FTCA had completely waived sovereign immunity, the govern-
ment contractor defense would have been negated, as there would have been
no sovereign immunity for the government contractor to share. 28
18. Bynum, 770 F.2d at 564.
19. Id. See, e.g., Myers v. United States, 323 F.2d 580 (9th Cir. 1963).
20. 309 U.S. at 20. "The Yearsley defense requires a contractor to prove that the government is immune
from suit, that the contractor is an agent of the government rather than an independent contractor, and that
the contractor acted within the scope of its [validly conferred] agency status." See Note, supra note 15, at
1133 n.15.
21. Bynum, 770 F.2d at 564. See Whitaker v. Harvell-Kilgore Corp., 418 F.2d 1010, 1014-15 (5th Cir.
1969) (court held that manufacturers of grenades and fuses made according to government specifications
were independent contractors and not entitled to sovereign immunity).
22. Bynum, 770 F.2d at 564. See Comment, supra note 15, at 228.
23. Note, Liability of a Manufacturerfor Products Defectively Designed by the Government, 23 B.C.L.
REV. 1025, 1048-49 (1982). See McKay, 704 F.2d at 448; Bynum, 770 F.2d at 560.
24. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 139 (1950). See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF
TORTS 1032 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter W. PROSSER].
25. W. PROSSER, supra note 24, at 1033.
26. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2402, 2671-80 (1982).
27. Congress consented to liability for:
injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or
omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employ-
ment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant
in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982).
28. Note, Government Contract Defense: Sharing the Protective Cloak of Sovereign Immunity after McKay
v. Rockwell International Corp., 37 BAYLOR L. REV. 181, 185 n.23 (1985).
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C. The Feres-Stencel Doctrine
Proponents of the government contractor defense have reasoned that expos-
ing such contractors to tort liability would undermine the rationale of govern-
ment immunity 29 established in Feres v. United States30 and Stencel Aero
Engineering Corp. v. United States. 31 In Feres the Supreme Court held that
the government is not liable under the FTCA 32 for "injuries to servicemen where
the injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service." 33 The
Court cited three reasons for construing the FTCA to preclude suits involving
the injury or death of servicemen occurring during military service. First, the
Court recognized that the relationship between the federal government and mem-
bers of the armed forces is "distinctively federal in character" 3 and that "[n]o
federal law recognizes a recovery such as claimants seek." 35 The Court recog-
nized as well that the FTCA does not create new causes of action; rather, the
statute permits suits against the government under certain limited circumstances
when suit would be permitted against a private individual. 36 The Court thus
concluded that because no analogous situation exists in the private sector the
Act should not be construed "to visit the Government with novel and unprecedent-
ed liabilities." 37 The Court also noted that the government has provided for
injured servicemen through the Veterans' Benefit Act. 38 The Court observed
that "[tihe compensation system, which normally requires no litigation, is not
negligible or niggardly . . . . The recoveries compare extremely favorably with
those provided by most workmen's compensation statutes." 
39
The holding in Feres was subsequently extended in Stencel, in which the Court
based its decision on the Feres rationale. 40 In Stencel a serviceman who was
injured while attempting to eject from a fighter aircraft during a midair emer-
gency brought suit against both the manufacturer and the United States. 41 The
manufacturer cross-claimed against the government for indemnification. 42 The
Court held that under the FTCA4 3 the United States is not required to indem-
29. Ramey v. Martin-Baker Aircraft Co., 656 F. Supp. 984, 989 (D. Md. 1987). See also Bynum, 770
F.2d at 560-62; McKay, 704 F.2d at 448; Note, supra note 15, at 1134.
30. 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
31. 431 U.S. 666 (1977).
32. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1948), amended by 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1988).
33. Feres, 340 U.S. at 146.
34. Id. at 143.
35. Id. at 144.
36. Id. at 141.
37. Id. at 142.
38. 38 U.S.C. §§ 321, 331 (1982).
39. Feres, 340 U.S. at 145.
40. Stencel, 431 U.S. at 674.
41. Id. at 667.
42. Id. at 668.
43. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1948), amended by 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1988).
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nify a third party for damages paid by it to a serviceman for a service-related
injury. 44
The Stencel Court reviewed Feres and found that the rationale of Feres pro-
hibited a third party from recovering in an indemnity action against the federal
government. 45 The Stencel Court also noted that permitting such an indemni-
ty claim would be essentially the same as allowing a direct action against the
government. 46 The Court observed that "itihe trial would, in either case, in-
volve second-guessing military orders, and would often require members of
the Armed Services to testify in court as to each other's decisions and ac-
tions." 47 Since Stencel, prohibiting possible impairment of military discipline
and effectiveness and discouraging the judiciary from second-guessing military
decisions have become the primary rationales for what has become known as
the Feres-Stencel doctrine. In United States v. Shearer 4 the Court stated that
the other factors in Feres and Stencel were "no longer controlling" 9 and that
the essential issue had become "whether the suit requires the civilian court to
second-guess military decisions [citation omitted] and whether the suit might
impair essential military discipline .. 5 . 0
The Feres-Stencel doctrine is generally recognized as being "the catalyst for
the development of the modern government contractor defense." 51  Feres and
Stencel present the policies and holdings by which government contractors have
44. Stencel, 431 U.S. at 673.
45. Id. at 671-72.
46. Id. at 673.
47. Id.
48. 473 U.S. 52 (1985).
49. Id. at 58 n.4.
50. Id. at 57. See Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 302 (1983) (military decisions are governed by
civilian control of the legislative and executive branches, not the judicial branch). See also Sanner v. Ford
Motor Co., 144 N.J. Super. 1, 364 A.2d 43 (Law Div. 1976), affdper curiam, 154 N.J. Super. 407, 381
A.2d 805 (App. Div. 1977), cert. denied, 75 N.J. 616, 384 A.2d 846 (1978). In Sanner the New Jersey
Superior Court held that a government contractor will not bear liability for which the government is respon-
sible yet immune. Id. at 8-9, 364 A.2d at 46-47. A passenger in a jeep manufactured by Ford in accordance
with United States Army specifications was thrown from the jeep and injured. Id. at 3, 364 A.2d at 43-44.
The passenger sued Ford on a strict liability theory on the ground that the vehicle was defectively designed
because it lacked seat belts and a roll bar. Id. at 5, 364 A.2d at 44-45. Ford claimed immunity from liability
because it manufactured the jeep in conformance with government specifications, id. at 4-5, 364 A.2d at
44, and the court held that a manufacturer complying with government specifications is protected from lia-
bility. Id. at 8-9, 364 A.2d at 46-47. The court concluded that if contractors were held liable they would
pass the cost of liability to the government through increased contract prices, subverting the government's
immunity for discretionary functions under the FTCA. Id. at 9, 364 A.2d at 47. Deference toward the mili-
tary decision making process was also a factor in extending immunity to the government contractor: "[tlo
impose liability on a governmental contractor who strictly complies with the plans and specifications provid-
ed to it by the Army in a situation such as this would seriously impair the governments [sic] ability to formu-
late policy and make judgments pursuant to its war powers." Id. at 9, 364 A.2d at 47. The Sanner opinion
thus acknowledged for the first time a separation of powers concern and a need to defer to military judg-
ments concerning product safety. Although the Sanner court did not explicitly provide the necessary ele-
ments for successful assertion of the government contractor defense, the court apparently adopted a precursor
of the defense. THE GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR DEFENSE: A FAIR DEFENSE OR THE CONTRACTOR'S SHIELD?
8-9 J. Madole ed. (1986) [hereinafter THE GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR DEFENSE]. See Note, supra note
15, at 1136; Note, supra note 23, at 1057-58.
51. THE GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR DEFENSE, supra note 50, at 7.
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come to derive protection from liability by sharing in the government's sover-
eign immunity. After the Stencel decision in 1971, the avenue of recovery for
service-related injuries was against the military contractor. The development
of the government contractor defense was in direct response to increased liti-
gation for tort liability against manufacturers of military products. 52 The defense
came into sharp judicial focus in the 1980s.
D. Three Formulations of the Government Contractor Defense
Prior to Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 53 courts had articulated three
different tests under which a government contractor could successfully assert
the defense. The tests were announced in In re 'Agent Orange" Product Lia-
bility Litigation, 54 McKay v. Rockwell International Corp., 11 and Shaw v.
Grumman Aerospace Corp. 56
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York first
delineated the elements of the government contractor defense in In re "Agent
Orange"Product Liability Litigation (Agent Orange II). "' Vietnam Conflict vet-
erans and members of their families claimed to have suffered injuries which
resulted from the veterans' exposure to the chemical defoliant "Agent
Orange." 5 8 The Agent Orange H court examined reasons for application of the
government contractor defense in that case: "to permit the government to wage
war in whatever manner the government deems advisable, and to do so with
the support of suppliers of military weapons."5 9 The court reiterated the poli-
cy rationale set forth by earlier decisions that the judiciary should not try to
"second guess" military decisions:
52. THE GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR DEFENSE, supra note 50, at viii.
53. 108 S. Ct. 2510 (1988).
54. 534 F. Supp. 1046 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1067 (1984).
55. 704 F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984).
56. 778 F.2d 736 (l1th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2896 (1988).
57. 534 F. Supp. 1046 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1067 (1984) (Agent Orange II). Also
relevant is In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 506 F. Supp. 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1980), rev'd,
635 F.2d 987, cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1067 (1984) (Agent Orange 1).
58. Agent Orange 1, 506 F. Supp. at 768. In this case the plaintiffs sued the manufacturers of Agent
Orange, asserting various theories of liability. Id. at 769. The defendants asserted the government contrac-
tor defense, claiming they had manufactured Agent Orange in strict compliance with government specifica-
tions and the specifications contained no obvious defects. Id. at 795. The court recognized the existence
of the government contractor defense based on policy considerations. The court stressed the limited role
courts should play in reviewing military decisions:
If claims for injuries sustained by members of the armed forces in the execution of military orders
were subjected to the scrutiny of courts of justice, then the civil courts would be required to examine
and pass upon the propriety of military decisions. The security and common defense of the country
would quickly disintegrate under such meddling.
Id. at 77 1. The court also pointed to the lack of discretion by the contractor who is compelled to follow
government specifications and should in fairness share vicariously in the government's immunity from lia-
bility: "[T]ort liability principles properly seek to impose liability on the wrongdoer whose act or omission
caused the injury, not on the otherwise innocent contractor whose only role in causing the injury was the
proper performance of a plan supplied by the government." Id. at 793.
59. 534 F. Supp. at 1054 n.1.
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Courts should not require suppliers of ordnance to question the military's needs
or specifications for weapons during wartime. Whether to use a particular weapon
that creates a risk to third parties, whether the risk could be avoided at additional
cost, whether the weapon could be made safer if a longer manufacturing time
were allowed, indeed, whether the weapon involves any risk at all, are all proper
concerns of the military which selects, buys and uses the weapon. But they are
not sources of liability which should be thrust upon a supplier, nor are they deci-
sions that are properly made by a court. 60
The court noted, however, that public policy requires that such military deci-
sions be based on any pertinent information known to the supplier; in other
words, the supplier has a duty to apprise the military of any known hazards
in order to insulate itself from liability for damages resulting from a product
supplied to the military in compliance with government specifications. 61 The
court cited that the reason for the supplier's duty to inform the military of known
risks was "to provide the military with at least an opportunity fairly to balance
the weapon's risks and benefits." 
62
The Agent Orange H court set forth three elements of the government con-
tractor defense that the defendant must establish in order to be insulated from
liability:
1. That the government established the specifications for [the ordnance];
2. That the [ordnance] manufactured by the defendant met the government's
specifications in all material respects; and
3. That the government knew as much as or more than the defendant about the
hazards to people that accompanied use of [the ordnance]. 63
The court thus determined that the defense would defeat liability if the manufac-
turer could prove the government established the design, the manufacturer com-
plied with the design, and the manufacturer apprised the government of known
dangers in the design. 64
It is unclear exactly what the court meant by the requirement that the govern-
ment "establish" the specifications. The court rejected the plaintiff's argument
that under the defense the defendants must prove that they had "neither direct
nor indirect responsibility" for preparing the design specifications. 65 The court
did not state the amount of responsibility the manufacturer would be allowed
in order to fulfill this element of the defense; however, the court did state that
the only necessity for this element of the defense is "for [the] defendant to prove
60. Id. at 1054.
61. Id. at 1055.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. It is worth noting that the court expressly stated that the establishment by the defendant of the
elements of the government contractor defense would defeat an action under any theory of recovery, whether
negligence, strict liability, or breach of warranty. Id. at 1055-56.
65. Id. at 1056.
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that the product it supplied was a particular product specified by the govern-
ment." 6 6 Implicit in the opinion is the possibility that the defense might bar
a government contractor's liability for a design defect where the contractor par-
ticipated in the preparation of the specifications and the government "approved"
them.
In McKay v. Rockwell International Corp., 67 the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit refined Agent Orange H's three-part test for appli-
cation of the government contractor defense and added the requirement that
the contractor would be immune from liability only if the government would
also be immune under the Feres-Stencel doctrine. 68 The court held that, under
the Feres-Stencel doctrine and the government contractor rule, a supplier of
military equipment is immune from liability for a design defect where:
(1) the United States is immune from liability under Feres and Stencel, (2) the
supplier proves that the United States established, or approved, reasonably pre-
cise specifications for the allegedly defective military equipment, (3) the equip-
ment conformed to those specifications, and (4) the supplier warned the United
States about patent errors in the government's specifications or about dangers in-
volved in the use of the equipment that were known to the supplier but not to
the United States. 69
The McKay court clearly stated that it is permissible for the government to ap-
prove, as well as to establish, design specifications in order for the contractor
to satisfy the second element of the defense. This broadens this element as stated
in Agent Orange II7 and specifically allows the contractor more participation
in the design process in order to successfully assert the government contractor
defense.
The McKay court delineated the rationale for applying the defense, emphasizing
that the application of the government contractor defense to suppliers of mili-
tary equipment approved by the government was supported by the same ration-
ale supporting the Feres-Stencel doctrine. 71 Permitting claims against
66. Id.
67. 704 F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984).
68. Id. at 451.
69. Id. The court noted the imprecision of the term "military equipment" but declined to engage in judi-
cial line-drawing. The court did go so far as to state that the line lay between an ordinary consumer product
purchased by the armed forces, such as a can of beans (which does not fall within the term), and the escape
system of a Navy RA-5C reconnaissance aircraft (which does fall within the term). Id. The court noted as
well that the rule it formulated relieves suppliers of military equipment of liability for design defects-not
for defective manufacture. Id.
70. 534 F. Supp. at 1055.
71. 704 F.2d at 449. The court determined that:
holding the supplier liable in government contractor cases without regard to the extent of government
involvement in fixing the product's design and specifications would subvert the Feres-Stencel rule
since military suppliers, despite the government's immunity, would pass the cost of accidents off to
the United States through cost overrun provisions in equipment contracts, through reflecting the price
of liability insurance in the contracts, or through higher prices in later equipment sales.
Id. See Comment, supra note 15, at 234.
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government contractors for damages resulting from design defects approved
by the government would undermine the Feres-Stencel governmental immuni-
ty by allowing suppliers to pass on the costs of liability indirectly to the United
States through higher contract prices. 72
Citing separation of powers concerns, the court then reasoned that to hold
a military contractor liable for a design defect which the government established
or approved would "thrust the judiciary into the making of military deci-
sions." 73 A trial for a design defect approved by the government would in-
volve second guessing the military and would possibly affect military disci-
pline, 1, as well as national security. "I
The court noted that the development of military equipment requires pushing
technology to its limits, incurring risks that would be unacceptable in consumer
goods. 76 The final reason observed by the court for providing for the govern-
ment contractor defense is that the defense provides incentives for suppliers
of military equipment to cooperate with military authorities in developing and
testing the equipment. 11
In 1985 the Eleventh Circuit articulated a third formulation of the govern-
ment contractor defense in Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp. 78 In so doing,
the court adopted the term "military contractor defense" rather than "govern-
ment contractor defense," asserting that the former term is more descriptive
and precise. 19 Although the court recognized McKay I as expressing the leading
version of the military contractor defense, 81 the court rejected the McKay
formulation 82 as well as its rationale for the defense. 83 The Eleventh Circuit
72. Id. The court cited to Stencel, 432 U.S. at 673 (quoting from Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797, 802
(1972)) ("To permit [petitioner] to proceed ... here would be to judicially admit at the back door that which
has been legislatively turned away at the front door. We do not believe that the [Federal Tort Claims] Act
permits such a result.").
73. Id. at 449.
74. Stencel, 431 U.S. at 673.
75. McKay, 704 F.2d at 449.
76. Id. at 449-50.
77. Id. at 450. The dissenting opinion in McKay criticized the majority for using the Feres-Stencel doc-
trine and the government contractor defense to protect Rockwell from liability. 704 F.2d at 456 (Alarcon,
J., dissenting). The dissent asserted that the doctrine is concerned only with government, not contractor,
liability. Id. The dissent noted that the plaintiffs in McKay filed neither a direct claim nor an indirect claim
for indemnification against the government, thus placing their claims outside the rationale of the Feres-Stencel
doctrine. Id. The dissent also asserted that the pass-through rationale for the defense denies the realities of
the free-market system. Id. at 457-58. Because contractors incorporate the potential costs of liability into
the final contract price, this rationale for the defense is invalid.
The dissent especially criticized the majority for allowing the defense for any contractor who secures
the government's approval for the design. Id. at 458. The dissent concluded that the defense should require
government compulsion to allow a contractor to share the government's immunity because it is only in that
situation that "the contractor's behavior [will] be the result of governmental discretion and direction." Id.
at 459. See Note, Sovereign Immunity -The Government Contractor Defense: Preserving the Government's
Discretionary Design Function, 57 TEMP. L.Q. 697, 704 (1984).
78. 778 F.2d 736 (1 1th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2896 (1988).
79. 778 F.2d at 739 n.3.
80. 704 F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984).
81. Shaw, 778 F.2d at 741.
82. Id. at 745.
83. Id. at 741-43.
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rejected the pass-through rationale as irrelevant, citing the McKay dissent. 84 The
court noted that since United States v. Shearer 85 the "limitation of government
liability rationale behind the Feres-Stencel doctrine appears . . . to be 'no longer
controlling."' 86 The court stated that it would "not recognize a military con-
tractor defense simply to shield such contractors-and (only arguably) the
government- from the cost of liability for defectively designed products." 87 The
Shaw court flatly stated that the defense is based solely on the constitutional
separation of powers: "[Tihe military must be free to decide that the risk of
accident or injury to servicemen from a design defect in the equipment it ord-
ers is a risk that it is willing to take-without judicial interference. This is the
basis for the military contractor defense in this Circuit." 88
The court emphatically stated that it was formulating a "narrow exception
to the product liability law that governs all other product designers."89 The
court recognized "a military contractor defense . . . based exclusively on the
theory that the constitutional separation of powers compels the judiciary to defer
to a military decision to use a weapon or weapons system (or a part thereof)
designed by an independent contractor, despite its risks to servicemen." 90
The Shaw court reviewed the two major formulations of the defense-
McKay 91 and Agent Orange H192 - and found them both unsatisfactory. 93 The
court's central concern in formulating its standard was "whether or not the military
actually made a decision to use a product that it knew to be dangerous to
servicemen." 94 The court emphasized that the defense required that the design
represent a judgment by the military-not by the supplier. The court thus
pronounced a version of the government contractor defense that would bar a
claim against a government contractor for an allegedly defective design. 95 The
first part of the test allows the contractor to participate in the design process,
but the participation must be "so minimal as to excuse it from proving the second
84. Id. at 742. See McKay, 704 F.2d at 457 (Alarcon, J., dissenting).
85. 473 U.S. 52 (1985).
86. Shaw, 778 F.2d at 742 (quoting United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 58 n.4 (1985)).
87. Id.
88. Id. The court noted that this rationale reflects the justification discussed in Feres concerning whether
the court would be required to second-guess military decisions. Id.
89. Id. at 741.
90. Id. at 743.
91. 704 F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984).
92. 534 F. Supp. 1046 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1067 (1984).
93. Shaw, 778 F.2d at 745.
94. Id. The Shaw court cited approvingly that "no separation of powers concern arises unless the design
in question represents a judgment by the military" (quoting In re Air Crash Disaster at Mannheim Germany,
769 F.2d 115, 121 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1082 (1986)). Id.
95. Id. at 745-46 (emphasis in original). To escape liability, the court stated that a contractor must affir-
matively prove:
(1) that it did not participate, or participated only minimally, in the design of these products or parts
of products shown to be defective; or (2) that it timely warned the military of the risks of the design
and notified it of alternative designs reasonably known by the contractor, and that the military, although
forewarned, clearly authorized the contractor to proceed with the dangerous design.
Id. at 746.
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part of the test." 96 Element two requires the contractor to warn the military
of the product's risks and to inform the military of design alternatives which
are known or reasonably should have been known by the contractor. 97 Element
two requires as well a showing that the military "clearly authorized the con-
tractor to proceed with the dangerous design." 9 The salient feature of this test
is whether the military, armed with clear knowledge of inherent defects in the
design, nonetheless authorized the contractor to proceed. 99
The elements of the government contractor defense enunciated by the Ninth
Circuit in McKay have been adopted by courts in other circuits. 100 In Bynum
v. FMC Corp. 101 the Fifth Circuit adopted the McKay enunciation of the govern-
ment contractor defense. 102 The Bynum court determined that the primary justifi-
cation for the defense is the same as that applying to the Feres-Stencel
doctrine: "members of the armed services should not be able to challenge the
decisions and actions of military authorities by thrusting the judiciary into the
role of adjudicating what are essentially military matters." 1 03 The Seventh Circuit
in Tillett considered the Agent Orange H formulation of the government con-
tractor defense and rejected it in favor of the McKay formulation because the
inclusion of Feres-Stencel immunity for the government as an element of the
defense "better reflects the influences of Feres-Stencel immunity upon the rela-
tionship between the Government and its contractors." 104 The court refused
to require the contractor to prove that the government compelled it to fulfill
the military equipment contract in order to successfully assert the defense. 105 In
Tozer the Fourth Circuit adopted the McKay formulation of the defense, 106 citing
as primary justifications for the defense separation of powers considerations
and protection of the "process of military procurement." 107 The court stated
that withholding judicial judgment on military matters is not only a constitu-
tional separation of powers issue but also it is a matter of sound policy that
96. Id. at 746.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. The court stressed that authorization must be more than "rubber-stamp" approval. Id.
100. See Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2897 (1988); Bynum
v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556 (5th Cir. 1985); Tillett v. J.I. Case Co., 756 F.2d 591 (7th Cir. 1985). In
Koutsoubos v. Boeing Vertol, the Third Circuit purported to adopt the Agent Orange H test, stating that
in McKay the Ninth Circuit "rephrased" the Agent Orange test. 755 F.2d 352, 355 (3d Cir. 1985>, cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 821 (1985). See Bynum, 770 F.2d at 567 n.14.
101. 770 F.2d 556 (5th Cir. 1985).
102. Id. at 567.
103. Id. at 569. The court further concluded that not only is control of military matters by the legislative
and executive branches of the federal government a separation of powers issue, but it is as well a matter
exclusively within the ambit of the federal government, implicating "uniquely federal interests." Id.
104. 756 F.2d at 598 n.4.
105. Id. at 597.
106. 792 F.2d 403, 408 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2897 (1988).
107. Id. at 405. Barring recovery in such actions would not leave servicemen or their survivors without
any relief as the Veterans' Benefits Act provides a remedy in many such circumstances. The court thus noted
that "one classic rationale for tort liability-that of compensation of victims-is less compelling in this con-
text." Id. at 407.
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decisions on issues of "common survival and defense" be made by those branches
with expertise, knowledge, and accountability. 108 The court expressed its con-
cern about "altering the nature of the procurement process": "we anticipate that
in the absence of the [government contractor] defense, there would be a decrease
in contractor participation in design, an increase in the cost of military weaponry
and equipment, and diminished efforts in contractor research and develop-
ment." 109
Those circuits that have considered the government contractor defense have
adopted a version of it. 110 With the exception of the Eleventh Circuit's differ-
ing formulation of the defense in Shaw, McKay has provided the leading enun-
ciation of the defense. Courts have articulated differing policy justifications
and rationales which undergird the defense. I In light of the rationale on which
the Supreme Court rested the government contractor defense in Boyle, it is im-
portant to note that most courts which had previously recognized the govern-
108. Id. at 405.
109. Id. at 407. The court recognized that in order for military technology to continue to advance contrac-
tor participation in the design process is essential. The continuous "back-and-forth" between the military
and the contractor is an important part of the process. Id. (quoting Koutsoubos, 755 F.2d at 355). If govern-
mental approval of the design consists of more than rubber stamping, then the defense is available to the
contractor. Id. at 407-08.
110. The Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have adopted an essentially uniform
formula for application of the government contractor defense. See In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability
Litigation, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2898 (1988); Dowd v. Textron, Inc.,
792 F.2d 409 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2897 (1988); Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403
(4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2897 (1988); Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556 (5th Cir. 1985);
Tillett v. J.1. Case Co., 756 F.2d 591 (7th Cir. 1985); Brown v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 741 F.2d 656
(3d Cir. 1984); McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043
(1984). In Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d 736 (11 th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct.
2896 (1988), the Eleventh Circuit adopted a different formulation of the defense. See supra notes 78-99
and accompanying text.
111. See, e.g., Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403, 405-07 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct.
2897 (1988) (court's decision rested on fairness, need to encourage contractor participation, avoidance of
pass-through costs, and, particularly, separation of power considerations); Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace
Corp., 778 F.2d 736, 742-43 (1 1th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2896 (1988) (court's formulation
of the defense rested on separation of powers concerns and the inappropriateness of the judiciary second-
guessing military decisions); Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556, 565-66 (5th Cir. 1985) (court's rationale
based on need to protect military decisionmaking, avoidance of pass-through costs, incentives for contractor
to work closely with the military, and fairness); Tillett v. J.I. Case Co., 756 F.2d 591, 599 (7th Cir. 1985)
(rationale for defense includes fairness, separation of powers concerns, contractor compulsion, and incen-
tives for contractor to work closely with the military); Koutsoubos v. Boeing Vertol, 755 F.2d 352, 355
(3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 821 (1985) (rationale that justified application of the defense was
incentives for contractors to work closely with the military); McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444,
449-51 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984) (justifications for the defense included avoidance
of pass-through costs to the government, separation of powers concerns, and the providing of incentives
for manufacturers to work closely with military officials).
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ment contractor defense had based their rationale on reasons paralleling those
supporting the Feres-Stencel doctrine. 112
IV. INSTANT CASE
Writing for the majority, 113 Justice Scalia stated that Boyle required the Court
"to decide when a contractor providing military equipment to the Federal Govern-
ment can be held liable under state tort law for injury caused by a design
defect." 114 The Court patently refuted the petitioner's contention that "there is
no justification in federal law for shielding government contractors from liabil-
ity for design defects in military equipment." 115 The Court acknowledged that
no specific legislation immunizes government contractors from liability for de-
sign defects 116 but concluded that federal common law preempts conflicting
state law in order to protect "uniquely federal interests." 1"7 While the instant
case involves liability of a third party, rather than an obligation to the United
States under its contract, this liability arises out of the performance of a federal
contract, the interpretation of which clearly implicates "uniquely federal in-
terests." 11
The Court noted that another area of federal concern is the civil liability of
112. For example, the McKay court determined that holding a military supplier liable would thwart the
policy behind the Feres-Stencel doctrine because suppliers would pass additional costs on to the government
through cost overrun provisions. McKay, 704 F.2d at 449. Forcing the judiciary to review military decisions
would implicate separation of powers concerns. Id. The McKay court noted that the military must be al-
lowed to take risks in designing military equipment to continue advancing technologically. Id. at 449-50.
Finally, the court observed that recognizing the defense would encourage contractors to work closely with
military officials. Id. at 450. The Bynum court asserted that the most important policy reason for recognizing
the defense is "that a trial between a serviceman and a military contractor in which government specifica-
tions are at issue would inevitably implicate the same concerns that underlie the . . .Feres and Stencel deci-
sions." 770 F.2d at 565. The Tillett court adopted the reasons stated in McKay "for extending the umbrella
of Feres-Stencel immunity to government contractors." 756 F.2d at 597.
113. Boyle, 108 S. Ct. 2510, 2512 (1988). Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist,
C.J., and White, O'Connor, and Kennedy, JJ., joined. Id. Brennan, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which
Marshall and Blackmun, JJ., joined. Id. Stevens, J., also filed a dissenting opinion. Id.
114. Id. at 2513.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 2514. The Court has held that some areas are "so committed by the Constitution and laws
of the United States to federal control that state law is preempted and replaced, where necessary, by federal
law of a content prescribed (absent explicit statutory directive) by the courts-so-called 'federal common
law.'" Id. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan emphasized that Congress has remained silent in this
area and has failed to pass legislation granting such immunity, despite repeated attempts by government con-
tractors. 108 S. Ct. at 2519-20. Justice Brennan objected to the Court's judicial legislation and disagreed
with the propriety of imposing preemption under the facts of this case. Id. at 2520 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Justice Brennan feared the expansion of immunity well beyond the range of military equipment, allowing
suits by civilians to be barred. Id.
118. Id.
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federal officials acting in the course of their duties. 119 Although the instant
case involves an independent contractor performing under a procurement con-
tract rather than a federal official performing his duties, the same interest in
completing government work is implicated. 120 The Court concluded that fed-
eral common law should govern civil liabilities arising out of performance of
federal procurement contracts. 121
Even though the present dispute was between private parties, the Court stat-
ed that the federal government's interest in procuring equipment was nonethe-
less implicated. 122 The Court distinguished Miree v. DeKalb County 123 in which
case the federal interest was too remote to justify applying federal
law. 124 Conversely, the Court stated that imposing liability on government con-
tractors would affect government contracts' terms: the interests of the federal
government would be implicated either by the contractor refusing to manufac-
ture the government-specified design or by the contractor raising its price. 125
The Court held procurement of equipment by the United States to be an area
of uniquely federal interest; however, Justice Scalia noted that state law will
be displaced only where a significant conflict exists between a "'federal policy
or interest and the [operation] of state law'" 126 or when applying state law would
"'frustrate specific objectives"' of federal legislation. 127
119. id. The dissent objected to extending immunity from suit to "nongovemment employees whose authority
to act is independent of any source of federal law" and who are as removed from the workings of the federal
government as are government contractors. 108 S. Ct. at 2524 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The narrowness
of the federal interest and the immunity is deliberate. A federal officer, Brennan noted, exercises statutory
authority; and interfering with the exercise of discretion would subvert congressional will. On the other hand,
"a Government contractor acts independently of any congressional enactment." Id. Justice Brennan summed
up this contention by asserting that the "justifications for official immunity do not support an extension to
the Government contractors .. " Id. at 2525.
120. Id. at 2514. Responding to the dissent, id. at 2519, the Court emphasized that it was not suggesting
that the immunity enjoyed by federal officials might be extended to nongovemment employees, such as govem-
ment contractors. Id. at 2514 n. 1. The discussion, the Court stated, was included to indicate that the liability
of independent contractors performing work for the government is an area of uniquely federal interest. Id.
121. Id. at 2514. In support of this proposition, the Court cited its holding in Yearsley v. W. A. Ross
Constr. Co., 309 U.S. 18 (1940). (See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text.) The Court determined
that there was no distinction between the federal interest justifying Yearsley and barring liability in procure-
ment contracts. Id. at 2515. Dissenting, Justice Brennan contended that the Court incorrectly extended Yearsley
beyond the "takings context." 108 S. Ct. at 2525 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Unlike Sikorsky in the instant
case, the contractor in Yearsley was following, not formulating, government specifications. Even, however,
had Sikorsky manufactured the helicopter in strict compliance with the government's specifications, the analogy
with the contractor in Yearsley would be defective since Yearsley depended upon an agency relationship with
the government which was never alleged nor established in the instant case. Id. See Yearsley, 309 U.S. at 22.
122. Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2515.
123. 433 U.S. 25 (1977). In Miree, involving whether private parties could sue as third-party beneficiaries
to an agreement between a municipality and the FAA, the Court held that "state law was not displaced be-
cause 'the operations of the United States in connection with FAA grants such as these . . . would [not] be
burdened' by allowing state law to determine whether third-party beneficiaries could sue. ... Boyle, 108
S. Ct. at 2515 (quoting Miree, 433 U.S. at 30).
124. Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2515.
125. Id.
126. Id. (quoting Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 69 (1966)).
127. Id. (quoting United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728 (1979)).
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In the present case, federal and state interests conflicted, giving rise to a need
for preemption. The Court stated:
Here the state-imposed duty of care that is the asserted basis of the contractor's
liability (specifically, the duty to equip helicopters with the sort of escape-hatch
mechanism petitioner claims was necessary) is precisely contrary to the duty im-
posed by the Government contract (the duty to manufacture and deliver helicop-
ters with the sort of escape-hatch mechanism shown by the specifications). 128
The situations in which a significant conflict existed between state law and fed-
eral policy would be limited. For instance, the federal government would have
no significant interest in a defective escape-hatch in a helicopter which it ordered
out of stock; and a manufacturer of such a helicopter could not be shielded
from liability. 129
Surprisingly, the Court did not agree that the Feres doctrine alone supported
the defense. Justice Scalia concluded that applying the doctrine to the present
case could produce either too broad or too narrow a result. 130 Too broad a
result could occur in applying Feres when injuries were sustained by a defec-
tive helicopter purchased from stock: "[s]ince Feres prohibits all service-related
tort claims against the Government, a contractor defense that rests upon it should
prohibit all service-related tort claims against the manufacturer-making inex-
plicable the three limiting criteria for contractor immunity . . . that the Court
of Appeals adopted." 131 Too narrow a result could also be produced: since
the Feres doctrine applies only to service-related injuries, the defense could
not be invoked to prevent a civilian's suit in cases where it could be invoked
in a suit brought by a member of the armed forces. 132
The Court used the FTCA's "discretionary function" exception 133 as the stan-
dard for establishing the contours of significant conflict between state law and
federal interests. 134 Thus, preemption was appropriate because the design of
military equipment involves a discretionary function. Choosing designs involves
the balancing of technical, military, and social considerations, "including spe-
cifically the trade-off between greater safety and greater combat effective-
ness." 135 To permit judicial second guessing of these decisions would subvert
the rationale behind the FTCA exemption. 136 The Court observed as well that
128. Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2516. The Court noted that in Miree there was no attempt to impose on the
person contracting with the government "a duty contrary to the duty imposed by the Government contract." Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 2517. See supra notes 30-51 and accompanying text.
131. Id. (emphasis added).
132. Id.
133. The FTCA exempted from consent to suit "[a]ny claim .. based upon the exercise or performance
or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an
employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused." 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1982).
See supra notes 26 & 27 and accompanying text.
134. Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2517.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 2517-18.
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the financial burden of government contractors would ultimately be passed on
to the government.
137
Justice Brennan, dissenting, objected to the Court's invoking the discretion-
ary function exception to the FTCA,'138 stating that retaining immunity for the
government's discretionary acts does not imply a defense for contractors who
participate in those acts, even though the financial burden might be passed on
to the federal government.' 39 No more reason exists for federal common law
to bar a claim against contractors now that the government is liable for some
torts than when it was liable for none." * Justice Brennan concluded this ob-
servation by declaring the statute "inapplicable": "[tihe discretionary function
exception does not support an immunity for the discretionary acts of Govern-
ment contractors . "... 141
After basing its holding on "significant conflict with federal policy," the Court
adopted the version of the government contractor defense articulated by the
Fourth Circuit below.14 2 The Court stated:
Liability for design defects in military equipment cannot be imposed, pursuant
to state law, when (1) the United States approved reasonably precise specifica-
tions; (2) the equipment conformed to those specifications; and (3) the supplier
warned the United States about the dangers in the use of the equipment that were
known to the supplier but not to the United States.'
43
The first two elements ensure that the design was considered by a government
official, thereby placing it within the ambit of the discretionary function, and
not just by the contractor. The third element is necessary to ensure that the
manufacturer will convey all relevant knowledge concerning the product's de-
sign to the government officials so that they can more effectively carry out their
discretionary functions. 141
137. Id. at 2518. The dissent rejected this assertion by the majority. Id. at 2524. Justice Brennan particu-
larly objected to what he perceived as the majority's justification for the defense: not overburdening the na-
tional purse. Id. at 2528. He stated that "[w]e are judges not legislators" and if Congress did not deem it
wise or necessary to shield government contractors from tort liability for design defects then it was not the
place of the judiciary to create a defense. Id.
In a brief dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens likewise concluded that the instant case involved policy
selection " 'more appropriately [sic] for those who write the laws, rather than for those who interpret them.'"
Id. at 2529 (quoting United States v. Gillam, 247 U.S. 507, 513 (1954)) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice
Stevens stated that:
[wihen the novel question of policy involves a balancing of the conflicting interests in the efficient
operation of a massive governmental program and the protection of the rights of the individual-
whether in the social welfare context, the civil service context, or the military procurement context-I
feel very deeply that we should defer to the expertise of the Congress.
Id. at 2528.
138. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1982).
139. Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2526.
140. Id. at 2527.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 2518. The Court also noted that this was the version of the defense adopted by the Ninth Cir-
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The Court noted that it did consider the alternative version of the govern-
ment contractor defense adopted by the Eleventh Circuit in Shaw. 14 5 The Court
rejected this version because it did not "protect the federal interest embodied
in the 'discretionary function' exemption." ' 4 6 The design which is finally chosen
may reflect a policy judgment by the government, whether or not the contrac-
tor rather than officials developed the design. 1 47 It is not sound policy, the Court
observed, to deter active contractor participation in the design process.' 4 8
V. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
In Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., the Supreme Court firmly established
the validity of the government contractor defense in American jurispru-
dence. Although the Court adopted the McKay formulation of the defense, it
expressly rejected the Feres rationale as the policy infrastructure of the
defense. 149 The Court relied on the "discretionary function" exception to the
FTCA as the theoretical and statutory underpinning for the defense. 150 The
Court's reliance on the discretionary function exception suggests that the defense
may be raised whenever a contractor's liability is predicated on a defective product
design that the government approved within its discretionary function. This de-
cision will have a significant effect on the reasoning of courts and upon their
determinations in subsequent decisions. In applying the rationale of the dis-
cretionary function exception rather than that of Feres, "the Court laid the foun-
dation for applying the defense in a broad range" of circumstances. '5' Although
the Court's discussion on public policy considerations of the defense was limit-
ed, it did cite two. First, selecting designs for military equipment to be used
by the armed forces is a discretionary function which involves a balancing of
a number of factors; and second guessing of these judgments should be avoid-
ed. 152 Second, absent the defense, judgments against government contractors
would be passed on to the government itself through increased contract prices,
145. See supra notes 91-99 and accompanying text.
146. Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2518.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. See supra notes 130-32 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 133-37 and accompanying text.
151. Ayer, supra note 3, at 36. One commentator stated that protection of governmental decisionmaking
is the government contractor defense's true rationale and, therefore, the discretionary function exception
is a more appropriate rationale for the defense than the Feres doctrine. Ausness, Surrogate Immunity: The
Government Contract Defense and Products Liability, 36 DEF. L.J. 537, 574-75 (1987), reprinted from 47
OHIO ST. L.J. 985 (1986). The Feres doctrine protects not only discretionary decisions by the military but
also protects nonmilitary decisions from judicial review. The government contractor defense "is concerned
with conscious risk allocation decisions" and "not with risks created through negligence. ... Id. at 574.
152. Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2517-18. Although the Court does not so state, this assertion implies a recogni-
tion of a separation of powers issue discussed by a number of lower courts. See, e.g., Bynum, 770 F.2d
at 565; Tillett, 756 F.2d at 597; Shaw, 778 F.2d at 742; McKay, 704 F.2d at 449.
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undermining the government's immunity under the discretionary function ex-
ception. 153
in adopting the Fourth Circuit's version of the defense, '54 the Court stated
that the first two elements of the defense test fulfill the policy considerations
of the discretionary function-that is to say, they ensure that the design feature
was "considered" by a government officer and not just by the contractor. 155 The
choice of the word "considered" is unfortunate because it does not indicate what
in fact should underlie the first element of the defense: governmental respon-
sibility for "approval" of the ultimate design specifications. The third element
of the defense ensures that the government is apprised of all relevant informa-
tion in order to make highly informed judgments when balancing the factors
that will place final responsibility on the government, not the manufacturer. If
the government does not possess at least the same amount of knowledge con-
cerning possible hazards of a particular design as the manufacturer, then the
manufacturer should not be allowed to partake of the government's immunity
to shield itself from tort liability. 156 The keys to successful assertion of the
defense are governmental responsibility and governmental knowledge. If the
government is responsible for final approval of the design specifications and
the government is fully informed of all the contractor's knowledge, that is, if
the government is the entity weighing the risks and benefits, then the govern-
ment is responsible; and the government contractor defense should shield a
government contractor from liabilities for injuries resulting from a defective
design if the government itself would be immune from liability.
Opponents of the defense assert that allowing a government contractor to es-
cape liability for a defective design which it participated in formulating under-
mines one of the major policy considerations of the tort system -the compensation
of innocent victims for their injuries. 15I One possible solution to this problem
is for Congress to legislate an exception to the FTCA so that the government,
on which responsibility for the defective design rests, can be sued for compen-
sation. This solution is highly problematic, however, because it would not only
undermine the discretionary function exception on which the Court based its
holding in Boyle; but it would also subject the government to financial liability
for exercising that discretionary function, involving the judiciary in second-
guessing those decisions. Another possible solution is "direct reimbursement
to innocent parties through specific legislative relief" for compensation for certain
injuries. 158 Another possibility is to hold the government contractor to a more
stringent duty of warning the government of potential design risks. The third
153. Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2517-18.
154. See supra notes 142-44 and accompanying text.
155. Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2518.
156. See Note, supra note 23, at 1073-79.
157. See Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2524 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Shaw, 778 F.2d at 741.
158. Comment, The Government Contract Defense in Products Liability Cases, 34 NAVAL L. REV. 157,
183 (1985).
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element of the defense formulation could be modified to apply a higher duty
of care to the contractor: "(3) the supplier warned the United States about the
dangers in the use of the equipment that were known [,or should have been
known,] to the supplier but not to the United States." In other words, a govern-
ment contractor might have-or should have-superior knowledge to that of
the government in its industry; and, it could be held to a more exacting duty
in order to be shielded from liability by the defense. 159 The Court responded
to this possibility when it rejected the Shaw formulation of the defense: "[w]hile
this formulation may represent a perfectly reasonable tort rule, it is not a rule
designed to protect the federal interest embodied in the 'discretionary function'
exemption." 160 The defense is not formulated to protect the contractor from
its negligence; it is, rather, designed to protect governmental decisionmaking
from unwarranted judicial interference.
In his dissent Justice Brennan noted a potential problem with the Court's for-
mulation of the defense: a government contractor can share the government's
immunity from liability if it obtained approval of "reasonably precise specifi-
cations." 161 Courts deciding subsequent cases must decide on a case-by-case
basis what is a "reasonably precise" specification. The problem, however, is
with ensuring that the approval is more than a rubberstamping by the govern-
ment of specifications handed to it by the contractor. 162 Justice Brennan ad-
dressed this issue, objecting to approval of "reasonably precise specifications"
by a government official - an approval which might be "no more than a rubber-
stamp from a federal procurement officer who might or might not have noticed
or cared about the defects, or even had the expertise to discover them." 163 The
Court indirectly responded to this objection by stating that the first element of
159. The elements of the defense should foster the "continuous back-and-forth" between the government
and the contractor. Koutsoubos, 755 F.2d at 355. This would not only pool the skills of government and
contractor experts but it would also allow the government to have the full knowledge to weigh risks and
benefits of a design judgment.
160. Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2518.
161. Id. at 2519 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
162. Id. One commentator suggests that "[als long as government officials have made a meaningful deci-
sion to approve a particular product design," then whether the design was entirely the work of the contractor
is immaterial if the government decisionmakers were apprised of the design risks. Ausness, supra note 151,
at 591. If the purpose of the defense is to protect governmental discretionary decisionmaking, then the origin
of the design is not an issue: the issue is whether the government, with knowledge of the risks inherent in
the design, nonetheless approved the specific design. In so approving, the government, through a discretion-
ary decision, immunized itself from liability. The contractor, who is not responsible for that design deci-
sion, however defective, should not be held liable for a decision that ultimately rested with the government.
See Trevino v. General Dynamics Corp., 865 F.2d 1474 (5th Cir. 1989). In this case the Fifth Circuit
addressed the question of what constitutes "approval" under the first element of the Boyle defense. The court
concluded that the discretionary function exception underpinning the defense requires that the governmental
act involve the use of "policy judgment" -not just some element of choice. Id. at 1480. The court held that
"approval" under the Boyle defense requires more than a rubber stamp. "When the government merely ac-
cepts, without any substantive review or evaluation, decisions made by a government contractor, then the
contractor, not the government, is exercising discretion. A rubber stamp is not a discretionary function;
therefore, a rubber stamp is not 'approval.'" Id.
163. Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2519.
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the defense assures that "the design feature in question was considered by a
Government officer . . . ," 116 In this context the word "considered" indicates
the Court's concern that there be meaningful and thoughtful weighing of the
risks and benefits inherent in a particular design, not just blind approval.
The elements of the defense adopted by the Supreme Court preclude successful
assertion of the defense if a contractor is sued having fulfilled performance
specifications as opposed to design specifications. 165 For example, if a manufac-
turer contracts with the government to build a particular size submarine that
will travel at a certain speed, then liability for design defects should fall on
the responsible party, the manufacturer. The contractor should not be granted
governmental immunity because the government merely approved the product,
not the defective design specifications. "The defense is not intended to protect
contractors from their negligence." 1 66 If, however, the contractor were respon-
sible for working up the design specifications in the first place and established
that the government, with full knowledge of the risks inherent in the design,
approved those specifications, then the defense should be available to the con-
tractor. Under such circumstances, even though the contractor was originally
responsible for the design, the government was ultimately responsible for making
the final design judgments. 167
The Boyle decision resolved the question concerning whether a government
contractor may successfully assert the defense against a civilian- not just against
a member of the armed forces. 168 The Court rejected the Feres doctrine as the
source of the rationale for the government contractor defense since "that doc-
trine covers only service-related injuries, and not injuries caused by the mili-
tary to civilians .... ." 169 By justifying the defense through the discretionary
function exception of the FTCA, the Court has opened the door to barring claims
164. id. at 2518 (emphasis added).
165. Otherwise, allowing the contractor to share in the government's immunity under the discretionary
function exception would make no sense. If the contractor were responsible for the defective design specifi-
cations, then no federal interest would be implicated; and, under Boyle, the contractor would have no govern-
mental immunity under the discretionary function exception by which it could shield itself from liability.
Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2517-18.
166. Schwartz, The Government Contractor Defense After Boyle, 24 TRIAL 88, 92 (1988). The purpose
of the defense is to shield a governmental contractor from liability when it follows government-approved
specifications. If the government is responsible for the final design decision, then the contractor should not
be held responsible for that design.
167. Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2518.
168. See Ramey v. Martin-Baker Aircraft Co., 656 F. Supp. 984 (D. Md. 1987). In Ramey the court
stated that, as "the most salient justification for the defense is governmental immunity," the government con-
tractor defense could bar claims against military contractors for alleged design defects brought by civilian
plaintiffs. Id. at 991. See also infra note 176.
169. Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2517. See Secrest & Torpey, Government Contractor Defense-Absolute Immu-
nity for the Product Maker, 12 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 1, 15 (1988) (By eliminating the Feres doctrine from
the McKay test, the Supreme Court expanded the government contractor defense to include civilians as well
as military personnel.).
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of civilians as well as servicemen through the defense. 170 The Court stated,
"we think that the character of the jet engines the Government orders for its
fighter planes [which produce high noise levels] cannot be regulated by state
tort law, no more in suits by civilians than in suits by members of the armed
services." 171 Under this logic, notwithstanding that the majority's example is
relatively innocuous, the dissent's concern is justified: the contractor could in-
voke the defense to avoid liability by anyone injured by a defective design, such
as children who might be killed if a defectively designed aircraft crashed. 172
An issue left unresolved by the case is whether the defense applies to cases
involving military as well as nonmilitary equipment. 173 The Supreme Court
did not directly address this issue; and the lower courts, generally unwilling
to broaden the scope of the defense, have avoided the issue with varying degrees
of adroitness. 174 The dissent's assertion that the defense sweepingly applies to
military and nonmilitary equipment is somewhat justified. By rejecting the Feres
doctrine and applying the discretionary function exception as the rationale for
the defense, the Court suggested that the defense will indeed apply to nonmili-
tary equipment. On the other hand, the language used by the Court suggests'
application of the defense only to defectively designed military equipment. 175 In
setting forth its formulation of the defense, the Court stated that, when the three
elements are established, liability cannot be imposed "for design defects in military
equipment." 176 Lower courts faced with this issue will be forced to apply the
"discretionary function exception" rationale from Boyle, which would allow the
defense to apply to nonmilitary products. 177 Even though the defense has gener-
170. See Secrest & Torpey, supra note 169, at 18 ("[W]ith the dramatic expansion of the government
contractor defense by the United States Supreme Court, contractors can now use the defense in cases involv-
ing civilian plaintiffs as well as military plaintiffs.").
171. Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2517. The Fifth Circuit, citing this language from Boyle and the Court's reliance
on Yearsley, stated that a plaintiffs civilian status would not automatically prohibit assertion of the govern-
ment contractor defense. Garner v. Santoro, 865 F.2d 629, 637 (5th Cir. 1989).
172. Id. at 2520.
173. "It is unclear what role, if any, the unique and critical nature of the weapons procurement process
plays in the Court's holding in Boyle." Ayer, supra note 3, at 36.
174. See, e.g., Bynum, 770 F.2d at 565-71 (defense only applies to military equipment); Shaw, 778 F.2d
at 740 (court declines to address whether the defense applies to any product supplied to the military); Tillett,
756 F.2d at 598 (government contractor defense applies to all "military equipment," including pizza machines,
jeeps, tractors, and front-end loaders); McKay, 704 F.2d at 451 (line of distinction between military and
nonmilitary equipment falls somewhere between a can of beans and the escape system of a Navy RA-5C
reconnaissance aircraft).
175. Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2513, 2517, 2518. See Ramey v. Martin-Baker Aircraft Co., 874 F.2d 946,
949 (4th Cir. 1989)(court refers to the military contractor defense, in apparent disregard of the Boyle analysis).
176. Id. at 2518.
177. See Garner v. Santoro, 865 F.2d 629, 637-38 (5th Cir. 1989)(court declined to decide whether govern-
ment contractor defense applies to any specific product because the product in question, paint used on Navy
destroyers, was deemed military equipment); Trevino v. General Dynamics Corp., 865 F.2d 1474, 1479
(5th Cir. 1989) (deference to the discretionary function of the government determines the parameters of the
defense).
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ally been applied in a military context, the door has been opened for nonmili-
tary contractors to assert it." 8
The government contractor defense is designed to bar claims against govern-
ment contractors when the government is ultimately responsible for the allegedly
defective design of a product. The justification, Boyle concludes, for relieving
the contractor from liability is to ensure that the government's discretionary func-
tion is not hampered in the procurement of products where it designs or ap-
proves such designs of the contracted manufacturers."1 9 The defense should
be used only in rare circumstances when the government clearly has ultimate
responsibility for the design and full knowledge of risks inherent in the design
which are known by the contractor. It is beyond the scope of this casenote to
explore the important question as to whether the government itself should be
completely shielded from liability in such circumstances. Although a completely
onerous burden of proof should not be placed on the contractor seeking vicari-
ous sovereign immunity, the elements of the defense should place a stringent
burden on the contractor for successful assertion of the defense. This would
not impose an unfair burden on the government contractors and would lessen
the general unfairness to innocent plaintiffs who might otherwise be denied recov-
ery. Future cases will help resolve the issues surrounding the defense which
the Supreme Court left unanswered in Boyle. What is patently clear is that by
178. A few pre-Boyle courts have applied the government contractor defense in the context of nonmilitary
products. In Burgess v. Colorado Serum Co., 772 F.2d 844 (11 th Cir. 1985), a veterinarian sued a manufac-
turer of an animal vaccine, alleging he suffered injuries as a result of the manufacturer's failure to warn
of dangers to humans from accidental injection. The manufacturer produced the vaccine for the government
in strict compliance with detailed government specifications, including the particular language on the label
of the vaccine. Id. at 845. Noting that the government contractor defense was a favorite shield of military
contractors, the court concluded that the history and rationale of the defense do not limit assertion of the
defense solely by military contractors. "If a contractor has acted in the sovereign's stead and can prove the
elements of the defense, then he should not be denied the extension of sovereign immunity that is the govern-
ment contract defense." Id. at 846. The Eleventh Circuit's conclusion in Burgess comports with the rationale
of the Boyle decision.
In Price v. Tempo, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 1359, 1360 (E.D. Pa. 1985), the manufacturer of firefighting
equipment raised the defense in a suit brought by a fireman who was injured. The manufacturers invoked
the government contractor defense, contending that they were shielded from liability because the products
"conformed to specifications established by the City of Philadelphia." Id. The plaintiff argued that the poli-
cies justifying the government contractor defense applied only to contracts for military equipment. Id. at
1361 n.3. Adopting the Agent Orange formulation of the defense, the court concluded that the defense is
based on the policies underlying sovereign immunity, permitting application of the defense in nonmilitary
contexts. Id. at 1361-62 n.3. Although the court did not allude to the discretionary function exception, its
rationale for the availability of the defense for nonmilitary government contractors parallels the Boyle Court's
protection of governmental decisionmaking from unnecessary judicial interference.
Several commentators have noted that Boyle paved the way for subsequent decisions to apply the defense
in nonmilitary situations. See Note, Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.: New Ground for the Government
Contractor Defense, 67 N.C.L. REV. 1172, 1189-90 (1989) (reasoning used in Boyle will encourage exten-
sion of the defense to nonmilitary government contractors); Note, The Government Contract Defense After
Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 41 BAYLOR L. REV. 291, 308-15 (1989) (correct applications of the
defense in nonmilitary contexts); Note, United States Supreme Court Launches Government Contractor Defense
Into Orbit, 28 WASHBURN L.J. 327 (1988) (government contractor defense "eventually may provide a cloak
of governmental immunity to nonmilitary government contractors"). See also Ausness, supra note 151, at
579-81; Secrest, supra note 169, at 18.
179. Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2518.
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relying on the discretionary function exception to the FTCA as the rationale
for the defense, the Court has cracked open the door for lower courts to apply
the defense in circumstances broader than those involving military contrac-
tors. 180 In so resolving these issues, courts should balance the need to protect
government contractors from liability for defective designs for which they are
not responsible with the need to compensate innocent victims for their injuries.
Martha L. Jeffrey
180. Ayer, supra note 3, at 37.

